keynote

Uplift Modeling for Digital Advertising

Eustache Diemert

Criteo Al Lab





Agenda





Agenda





"HALF THE MONEY I SPEND ON ADVERTISING IS WASTED; THE TROUBLE IS I DON'T KNOW WHICH HALF."

JOHN WANAMAKER

Quote from 1894 (!)

Promise: Uplift Modeling let you know which half is useful

"HALF THE MONEY I SPEND ON ADVERTISING IS WASTED; THE TROUBLE IS I DON'T KNOW WHICH HALF."

JOHN WANAMAKER



The problem with clicks

the industry standard is (was) for marketers to pay providers per sale after a click



The new way to measure Ad efficacy

Incrementality = average causal effect of ads





Outline: how to use Uplift Models

From intervention to data, to learning UMs, to using them in production

- 1. Data collection
 - decide intervention
 - run the system, collect data
- 2. Learn models
- 3. Use predictions to improve production





A plausible causal model of advertising

Notations:

- **T (treatment)**: binary, intent to treat (bid or not)
- **E (exposure)**: binary, won the auction (ad displayed to user)
- V (visit): binary, user visited website
- C (conversion): binary, user converted (bought something)
- X (context): multi-dimensional, observable context
- **U (unobserved)**: multi-dimensional++, un-observed confounders

Assumptions

- T = 0 implies E = 0 (no bid implies no ads)
- V = 0 implies C = 0 (no conversion w/o visit)

Specificity:

• T=1 does not imply E=1: bidding doesn't imply exposure (because of competition, floor prices etc) aka "one sided noncompliance to prescription"





1st idea: intervene on the display

Outline

- 1. Bid in the auction as usual
- 2. When auction is won, decide to treat randomly
- 3. If user assigned to control population, display a blank ad (or a charity ad)

Interpretation: U(x) = P(C=1 | X=x, do(E=1)) - P(C=1 | X=x, do(E=0))

Problems

- Winning the auction and not displaying ad = you lose money
- Winning the auction prevents other competitors to display their ads = you under-estimate the causal effect
 - E=0 means "no display for the advertiser", but competitors can place ads and persuade customers to buy their product instead !





2nd idea: intervene on the bid

Outline

- 1. Decide to treat randomly
- 2. When in control, don't place any bid (conversely: in treatment bid as usual)
- 3. When auction is won, proceed as usual

Interpretation: U(x) = P(C=1 | X=x, do(T=1)) - P(C=1 | X=x, do(T=0))

Problem

14

- Not all bids are successful, so signal is drowned in noise
 - P(E=1|do(T=1)) can be as low as 15%
 - Can be alleviated by zooming on most plausible auction winners
 - using e.g. P^(E=1|do(T=1), X=x) as symmetrical filter/ranker









Challenge #1: noise in uplift signal

Subtitle

16

- Conversions are noisy by nature
 - P(C=1|E=1) =~ 1e-3/1e-4 --> Expectation and Variance are of the same order
 - May vary widely depending on vertical/advertiser (travel vs retail vs finance vs ...)
- Uplift is noisier than conversions
 - E[U] =~ 1e-5
 - Var[U] = Var[E[C=1|do(T=1)]] + Var[E[C=1|do(T=0)]] =~ 2* Var(C) =~ 2e-3





CRITEO

(both heavily up-sampled)

Solutions for noise

Subtitle

- "Zoom in" on the signal
 - Under some additional assumptions on the causal structure:
 - $P(C = 1 | x, T = 1) = [P(C = 1 | x, E = 1) P(C = 1 | x, E = 0)] \times P(E = 1 | x, T = 1) + P(C = 1 | x, E = 0)$

		<u> </u>	$ \begin{array}{c} \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$			_	<u> </u>	<u></u>	\sim	
•			~~~~						\sim	
	conv	ersion =	post-exposure uplif	t x	exposition prob.	+	"organic'	' conversior	า	

- Can rewrite "treatment" (causal) uplift as a function of post-exposure uplift
- (+) stronger signal
- (+) compatible with existing models
- (-) assumptions not always verified





Solutions for noise (2)

Use simple, heavily regularized models: Trees

- Target can be:
 - Reverse label (CVT)
 - Predicted uplift (from another model)
 - Post-exposure Uplift
- Prediction is average uplift within leaf
- (+) (relatively) robust to noise
- (+) useful in practice
- (-) not sure we can do better in difficult cases
- Probably other targets are possible



Challenge #2: Privacy constraints

How to learn uplift models from aggregated, differentially private data?

- Setup
 - Labels and features are aggregated
 - Summary statistics (count, sum) are noised with differential privacy
 - $\bullet \quad \mathsf{\epsilon} \operatorname{\mathsf{-DP}} \coloneqq \quad \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D_1) \in S] \leq \exp(\varepsilon) \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D_2) \in S],$
- Proposal
 - Learn a piece-wise constant, ε-DP model
- (+) works better than ε -DP protected gradient methods like ε -2Models
- (+) can be combined with ε-DP k-means
- (+) we have theoretical guarantees (PEHE bounds)
- (-) performance varies based on strata definition

Al	gorithm 1 & ADUM
1:	function TRAIN $((x_i, t_i, y_i)_{i \in [1,n]}, \pi \in \Pi_p(\mathcal{K}), D_y > 0, \epsilon > 0)$:
2:	for $k \in [1, p]$ do
3:	for $t \in \{0,1\}$ do
4:	$E_{k,t} = (y_i \mid \pi(x_i) = k, \ t_i = t)$
5:	$C_{k,t} = \text{COUNT}(E_{k,t}) + \frac{\text{Lap}(\frac{2}{\epsilon})}{1}$
6:	$S_{k,t} = \text{SUM}(E_{k,t}) + \frac{\text{Lap}(2\frac{D_y}{\epsilon})}{1}$
7:	$\widehat{y}_{k,t} = \frac{S_{k,t}}{C_{k,t}}$
8:	end for
9:	$\widehat{u}_k = \widehat{y}_{k,1} - \widehat{y}_{k,0}$
10:	end for
11:	$\mathbf{return} \ (\widehat{u}_k)_{k \in [1,p]}$
12:	end function
13:	
14:	function PREDICT $(x_{new} \in \mathcal{K})$:
	return $\widehat{u}_{\pi(x_{new})}$
15:	end function
0	
5	1.0e-01





How to use uplift predictions ?

Setup:

- A given advertiser has a fixed budget
- A typical "value based bidder" bids b(x) =~ P(C=1 | T=1,Click=1,X=x)
- Assume U(X) predictions available
- How to "act" with this additional information ? i.e. how to change our bids ?
- Note: we don't control the order of exposure opportunities

First idea:

- if U^(x) <= 0 then bid 0; bid as usual otherwise
- (-) predictions are noisy and very small on average we make errors
- (-) you can buy lots of cheap, sometimes useful inventory when bidding just above 0 we loose opportunities
- (-) re-investing saved budget on non-responders is not always useful we over-expose some groups

Advertising is a dynamic budget allocation problem



How to use uplift predictions ? (2)



Important remarks:

- U(X) = E[C=1 | X, do(Bid=prod)] E[C=1 | X, do(Bid=0)] : this is a "prod vs nothing" uplift
- U(X) is not predictive (in theory) of uplift when varying the bid level:
 - U(X) <> E[C=1 | X, do(Bid=b)] E[C=1 | X, do(Bid=prod)]

Also, we can assume:

- Spend is convex wrt to Bid (with some jumps increased bids make you win more auctions)
- Uplift is concave wrt to Bid (diminishing returns)

So we need to devise a much more complex system than just ranking individuals by uplift !



How to use uplift predictions? (3)

In theory we should solve that with RL...

But exploration is utterly costly !

Second idea:

- Work at population level (by strata / leaves)
- if uplift is high and exposure is low => over-bid (wrt to prod)
- Elif uplift is low or negative => under-bid (wrt to prod)
- Else => bid as usual
- Equalize costs between under- and over-bid
- (-) a bit ad-hoc... need a solver to equalize costs
- (+) approximately robust predictions: U(x, do(Bid=b)) =~ U(x, do(Bid=b')), when b' close to b
- (+) exposing more where current exposure is low
- (+) counter-factual techniques can predict effect of changes within uplift prediction strata
- (++) excellent practical results: up to 3x more incremental sales vs prod in AB test !





- Individual Treatment Prescription Effect Estimation in a Low Compliance Setting Thibaud Rahier, Amélie Héliou, Matthieu Martin, Christophe Renaudin and Eustache Diemert – KDD'21
- Uplift Modeling with Generalization Guarantees Artem Betlei, Eustache Diemert, Massih-Reza Amini KDD'21
- Differentially Private Individual Treatment Effect Estimation from Aggregated Data Artem Betlei, Théophane Gregoir, Thibaud Rahier, Aloïs Bissuel, Eustache Diemert, Massih-Reza Amini PPML'21
- Uplift prediction with dependent feature representation in imbalanced treatment and control conditions Artem Betlei, Eustache Diemert, and Massih-Reza Amini ICONIP 2018



